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ABSTRACT
Boot firmware, like UEFI-compliant firmware, has been the target
of numerous attacks, giving the attacker control over the entire
system while being undetected. The measured boot mechanism of
a computer platform ensures its integrity by using cryptographic
measurements to detect such attacks. This is typically performed by
relying on a Trusted PlatformModule (TPM). Recent work, however,
shows that vendors do not respect the specifications that have been
devised to ensure the integrity of the firmware’s loading process.
As a result, attackers may bypass such measurement mechanisms
and successfully load a modified firmware image while remaining
unnoticed. In this paper we introduce BootKeeper, a static anal-
ysis approach verifying a set of key security properties on boot
firmware images before deployment, to ensure the integrity of the
measured boot process. We evaluate BootKeeper against several at-
tacks on common boot firmware implementations and demonstrate
its applicability.
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1 INTRODUCTION
One of the most critical components of every computer is the
boot firmware (e.g., BIOS or UEFI-compliant firmware), which is in
charge of initializing and testing the various hardware components,
and then transfer execution to the Operating System (OS). As a
result of its early execution, the boot firmware is a highly privileged
program. Any malicious alteration of its behavior can have critical
consequences on the entire system. An attacker that can control the
firmware can control any parts of the software and undermine the
security of the entire OS. Without any protection of the integrity
of the boot firmware, we cannot assure any security properties of
the software executing on the system.
To guarantee the software integrity of the machine, the Trusted
Computing Group (TCG), an industry coalition formed to imple-
ment trusted computing concepts across personal computers, de-
signed a new set of hardware components, the aim of which is
to solve various hardware-level trust issues. In their specification,
they define the TPM, which is composed of a co-processor that
offers cryptographic functions (e.g., SHA-1, RSA, random number
generator, or HMAC) and a tamper-resistant non-volatile mem-
ory used for storing cryptographic keys [33]. The TPM along with
other software components together form a root of trust, which
is leveraged as part of several security mechanisms, including the
measured boot process. With measured boot, platforms with a TPM
can be configured to measure every component of the boot process,
including the firmware, boot loader, and kernel. Such measurement
process is also called the Static Root of Trust for Measurement
(SRTM).
The core of trust of the entire process is established based on
the integrity of the first piece of code inside the boot firmware
which is doing the first measurements, also called the Static Core
Root of Trust for Measurement (SCRTM) [41]. In the event where a
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malicious modification of the SCRTM successfully hides from the
self-measurement technique, the whole chain of trust and, conse-
quently, the integrity of the entire system may be broken. In this
direction, Butterworth et al. [4] described different examples of
attacks against the SCRTM component. In particular, the authors
show how a novel “tick” malware, a 51-byte patch to the SCRTM,
can replay a forged measurement to the TPM, falsely indicating
that the BIOS is genuine. These attacks take advantage of the fact
that some vendors do not measure the SCRTM code, thus allowing
an attacker to modify it and to forge measurements without being
detected.
Recent platforms incorporate an immutable, hardware protected
SCRTM [11, 23]. Intel Boot Guard and HP Sure Start are immutable
SCRTMs which measure and verify, at boot time, the integrity of the
BIOS image before executing it. Such technologies are not directly
vulnerable to the aforementioned attacks, since their code cannot
be modified by an attacker.1 Both technologies, however, are only
available in recent Intel and HP platforms, leaving previous hard-
ware implementations, or devices of other vendors, vulnerable against
forged measurements. In such implementations, since the SCRTM is
not hardware protected, it is usually attached to the firmware image
itself during the firmware update process. Even when the firmware
image is signed, attacks may compromise this process [14], and
consequently allow an attacker to modify both the firmware code
and the SCRTM.
In order to solve these challenges in validating the SCRTM code,
we design a self-contained approach based on static analysis at the
binary level, which is able, starting from a boot firmware image,
to validate the correctness of the measurement process. Our sys-
tem verifies software properties on the SCRTM code embedded
in firmware images, including: (1) the completeness of firmware
code measurements in terms of fingerprinted memory regions, (2)
the correctness of cryptographic functions implemented2 inside
the SCRTM (e.g., SHA-1), and (3) the correctness of the SCRTM’s
control flow. More in detail, the first property ensures that the code
of the entire firmware is measured correctly by the SCRTM, i.e., that
none of the instructions to be executed at runtime will be missed
by the measurement process. The second property ensures that the
implementation of cryptographic functions inside the SCRTM is
correct. The third property validates the correctness of the measure-
ment operations performed by the SCRTM in terms of execution
order. It also guarantees the atomicity of operations occurring be-
tween memory fingerprinting and write operations performed on
the TPM component (i.e., ensuring that what is measured is what is
written to the TPM). Altogether, this set of properties can prevent
attacks aiming to elude the measurement process, and it guarantees
that the integrity of a firmware image is properly verified during
the measured boot process.
We implement a prototype of our system, dubbed BootKeeper,
based on the angr program analysis framework [6, 29]. We evaluate
our system on different open source boot firmware images, and
we implement different attacks against the firmware to show the
1Nonetheless, Intel Boot Guard has been shown to be vulnerable to some attacks as
well [19].
2Vendors typically implement the cryptographic functionalities used as part of the
measurement process in software.
efficacy of our approach. Our paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
• We devise a set of software properties that can be used for
validating the measurement process and mitigate firmware
attacks aimed to subvert the entire system.
• We design and implement BootKeeper, a binary analysis
approach to detect and prevent measurement boot firmware
attacks in different attack scenarios.
• We perform experimental evaluation against different at-
tacks and several boot firmware implementations to demon-
strate the effectiveness of our approach.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the background technology needed
to understand our approach. We first describe the principles of the
TPM, then we describe the UEFI specifications and some of the
software/hardware components involved in the boot measurement
process.
2.1 Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
The TPM specification defines a co-processor offering cryptographic
features (e.g., SHA-1, RSA, random number generator, or HMAC),
and tamper-resistant storage for cryptographic keys [33].
The TPM provides a minimum of 16 Platform Configuration
Register (PCR) which are 160-bit wide registers used to store the
measurements done by the SCRTM (usually SHA-1 hashes). The de-
sign of these registers allows an unlimited amount of measurements
and prevents an attacker from overwriting them with arbitrary val-
ues. In order to do this, the only possible operation is extend:
PCRi = H (PCRi | |m)
Where PCRi is the ith PCR register, H is the hash function and
m the new measurement. The TPM concatenates each new measure-
ment sent with the previous value of the register, then it hashes
the result, which becomes the new value of the register. This mech-
anism is crucial to establishing a chain of trust, since the only way
to obtain a given measurement value from a PCR is to reproduce
the same series of measurements in the same order. The measured
boot process relies on this mechanism to guarantee that a given
software platform is valid and has not been tampered with.
The TPM also relies on these measurements to provide specific
features (e.g., secure storage or remote attestation). For instance,
with the sealing operation, the TPMoffers the ability to encrypt data,
with a key only known to the TPM, and it binds the decryption
to the PCRs values. During the decryption (i.e., unsealing), the
TPM only decrypts the data if the PCRs values match the ones
used during the encryption. One common use case for the sealing
operation is to store the disk encryption key. It ensures that the
disk is decrypted only if the platform has booted with the expected
hardware and software, and if no attacker tampered with the boot
process (e.g., an evil maid attack).
2.2 Static Core Root of Trust for Measurement
The SCRTM is responsible for the first measurement sent to the
TPM in the PCR0 register and it is considered trusted by default
on the system. Since the default values of the PCRs are known
(either 0x00...0x00 or 0xFF...0xFF), the entire trust in the SRTM
relies on the SCRTM. If it is possible for an attacker to modify the
SCRTM, then it is also possible for the attacker to forge the first
measurement, and the next one, etc.
Therefore, the TCG PC client specific implementation [31] states
that the SCRTMmust be an immutable portion of the firmware. The
specification defines immutability such that only an approved agent
and method can modify the SCRTM. Most firmware fulfill this re-
quirement by using signed updates, because the SCRTM can only be
modified if the update is coming from the vendor. Recent firmware
fulfill the requirement using an immutable hardware protected
SCRTM [11, 23]. Unfortunately, legacy platforms do not provide
signed updates, or do not require them. Furthermore, Kallenberg
et al. [12], and Wojtczuk and Tereshkin [37] have successfully ex-
ploited multiple vulnerabilities in the implementation of signed
firmware updates by vendors, allowing an attacker to update the
firmware with a malicious one. Finally, if the private key of the
vendor is compromised, the platform is vulnerable.
2.3 Unified Extensible Firmware Interface
In 2005, 11 industry leading technology companies created the
Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) forum which defines
specifications for interfaces [36] used by the OS to communicate
with the firmware [42] and Platform Initialization (PI) specifica-
tions [35] which define the required interfaces for the components
in the firmware, allowing multiple providers to create different
parts. UEFI specifications are about the interfaces, while UEFI PI
specifications are about building UEFI-compliant firmware. Manu-
facturers are now providing, as boot firmware replacing the Basic In-
put/Output System (BIOS), UEFI-compliant firmware images. UEFI
and PI specifications define seven phases, as illustrated in Figure 1,
which describe the boot process of a platform:
(1) The Security phase (SEC) is the initial code running, it switches
from real mode to protected mode, initializes the memory
space to run stack-based C code, and discovers, verifies and
executes the next phase.
(2) The Pre-EFI Initialization phase (PEI) initializes permanent
memory, handles the different states of the system (e.g., re-
covery after suspending), executes the next phase.
(3) The Driver Execution Environment phase (DXE) discovers
and executes drivers which initialize platform components.
(4) The Boot Device Selection phase (BDS) chooses the boot
loader to execute.
(5) The Transient System Load phase (TLS) handles special ap-
plications or executes the boot loader from the OS.
(6) The Runtime phase (RT) is when the OS executing, but there
are still runtime services of firmware available to communi-
cate with the OS.
(7) The After Life phase (AL) takes control back over the OS
when it has shutdown.
The TCG specifies requirements for the measurement of UEFI-
compliant firmware in TPMPCRs [34]. The SCRTM inUEFI-compliant
firmware is generally formed by the SEC and PEI phases [42], al-
though no strict requirements about its location are specified in the
TCG specification as it can also be the entire BIOS [31]. Moreover, in
recent platforms, the SCRTM is a hardware-protected component,
SEC PEI DXE BDS TLS RT AL
Power on Platform Initialization OS boot Shutdown
SCRTM
SRTM
UEFI PI phases
Exposed UEFI interfaces
Figure 1: UEFI PI phases with the ones corresponding to the
SCRTM and SRTM
outside of the BIOS, that performs measurements on the BIOS be-
fore its execution [11, 23]. In our work, however, we only consider
a non-hardware protected SCRTM.
3 APPROACH OVERVIEW
BootKeeper is an offline analysis approach leveraging state-of-the-
art binary analysis techniques to evaluate the validity and correct-
ness of boot firmware images.
3.1 Threat Model
Our approach targets systems that implement measured boot pro-
tection mechanisms by using Trusted Computing technology. From
a high-level perspective, an attacker may attempt to tamper with a
system’s firmware in two ways:
• By exploiting weaknesses of the SCRTM, e.g., a buggy or
incorrect SCRTM may only perform partial measurements.
In this case, an attacker may be able to inject code within
the vendor’s firmware image in the non-measured portions
of the memory.
• By directly injecting a malicious SCRTM, the attacker may
spoof the vendor’s golden measurement values to pretend
that the legitimate firmware is in place, while executing a
malicious version of it.
By successfully circumventing the measurement process, an
attacker may not only compromise the integrity of the system
while tricking the attestation procedure into reporting a legitimate
software platform, but it may also leak secret information from
the TPM such as cryptographic keys used for full disk encryption
(as used by Microsoft Windows’s BitLocker, among other software
products relying on this mechanism).
In the remainder of this paper, we assume the following attacker
model:
(1) The attacker does not have physical access to the system.
(2) The attacker does not have any form of privileged access to
the system (neither local or remote, i.e., no control over the
OS).
(3) The system itself has not been infected prior to the attack
and is non-malicious (i.e., the SCRTM is invoked from a
non-malicious environment).
(4) The SCRTM’s code does not implement user input mecha-
nisms (but such mechanisms may be implemented as part of
later stages of the EFI boot process).
(5) The attacker has the ability and sufficient knowledge about
the target platform to craft malicious firmware images, i.e.,
access to the vendors’ official firmware images, and knowl-
edge about the platform’s golden values (i.e., correct mea-
surement values), or the ability to obtain those by reverse
engineering.
(6) The attacker may spread malicious images online (e.g., by
compromising the vendor’s website or through third party
websites such as user forums).
(7) Optionally, the attacker may remotely interfere with the
automated firmware update process that comes with some
systems by compromising the download site, or by mounting
a man in the middle attack when applicable (e.g., if this
process does not check the validity of SSL certificates), to
trick the remote system into applying a firmware update
using an attacker-chosen malicious image.
3.1.1 Signature Verification. In order to successfully install a ma-
licious firmware image in the target system, an attacker needs to
bypass eventual signature verification mechanisms in place. While
this aspect is outside of the scope of this paper, we briefly demon-
strate the practicality of this assumption as follows.
A good practice when releasing software updates is to rely on
cryptographic signatures in order to guarantee the integrity of the
new software image before or during the installation process. Un-
fortunately, this process is often imperfect, as several vendors do
not implement proper signature verification mechanisms, leaving
gaps for an attacker to use a forged firmware image. In other situa-
tions, attackers may use a stolen certificate [14] to sign malicious
firmware images, or may remotely exploit a vulnerability in the
firmware update routine, to bypass the signature checks. In the
remainder of this paper, we assume that the signature verification
mechanism is either absent, or vulnerable.
3.2 Analysis Steps
Our analysis approach relies on the verification of a set of key
properties, which we describe in more detail the remainder of this
section.
3.2.1 Code Integrity Properties (CIP). The SCRTM code is always
implemented with two main fundamental operations: (1) an opera-
tion of fingerprinting, which scans the code regions in memory (e.g.,
using SHA-1) and (2) a TPM write operation, storing the computed
fingerprints in the TPM. We define these two operations as the
building blocks of any SCRTM measurement process performed on
the platform.
In order to elude the measurement process, an attacker may act
at two different levels.
• Firstly, as illustrated in Figure 2, the attacker may modify
the fingerprint function (e.g., code or parameters) to gener-
ate spoofed measurement values which correspond to valid
golden values (i.e., values corresponding to correct measure-
ments on the vendor’s firmware) even though the original
firmware code is modified.
• Secondly, the attacker may modify the results of the finger-
print function just before these are written to the TPM.
The tick and the flea attacks, described by Butterworth et al. [4],
are concrete examples of such attacks.
Legitimate
Hash Function
Legitimate
Firmware
Malicious
SCRTM
BIOS
TPM
1 Calls
with forged
parameters
3 Returns forged
fingerprint
4 Sends forged
fingerprint
2 Measures
Executed
Not executed
Figure 2: Example of a measurement-spoofing attack where
an attacker sends a legitimate fingerprint of non-executed
firmware.
In order to prevent these attacks, our system verifies the three
following properties:
(1) The authenticity of cryptographic hash functions. Regardless
of any potential implementation variants, our system must
be able to verify the authenticity of the code used as part of
the fingerprinting measurement process. BootKeeper lever-
ages binary analysis techniques to verify that the correct
hash function is indeed used as part of the firmware’s fin-
gerprinting code.
(2) The atomicity of the measurement process. A correct SCRTM
implementation should also guarantee the atomicity of its
measurement process, i.e., that the fingerprinting and TPM
write operations are invoked sequentially in the correct order,
and that the integrity of the measurement values if preserved
between these two operations. In order to verify this prop-
erty, BootKeeper constructs a Control-Flow Graph (CFG) of
the SCRTM, and detects eventual operations modifying the
measurement results before those are written to the TPM.3
These two properties ensure the correctness of the SCRTM’s
code measurements process. In addition to these, BootKeeper also
ensures that the firmware under analysis does not present risks of
certain classes of runtime attacks, as described below.
3.2.2 Code Execution Integrity Property (CEIP). Even if properties
(1) and (2) are guaranteed, an attacker may attempt to alter the
control-flow of the SCRTM by redirecting the execution to mali-
cious code hidden in the binary firmware image. Fortunately, UEFI
firmware runs in an execution environment protected by Data
Execution Prevention (DEP). In other words, an attacker cannot
trivially execute code injected in arbitrary sections of the binary
image.
3In practice, such operations may either correspond to malicious code attempt-
ing to forge measurement values, or to benign buggy code reporting erroneous
measurements.
In the execution context of the SCRTM, an attacker does not have
the ability to inject code at runtime since the SCRTM’s code does
not implement user input mechanisms and the SCRTM code is
invoked from a non-malicious environment (see rules 3 and 4 of
our attacker model in subsection 3.1). However, it remains possible
for the attackers to hide code within the binary firmware image,
and to attempt to trigger its execution at runtime.
B1
B2 B3
B4 M1
BIOS
Reachable and measured
Reachable and not measured
Figure 3: Example of an incomplete measurement of the
firmware where reachable (malicious) code is not measured.
BootKeeper addresses this family of attacks as well by relying
on an additional property:
(3) Completeness of the measurements. The SCRTMmust guaran-
tee the completeness of the measurements of the firmware
code memory regions. More in detail, every memory region
belonging to the CFG of the SCRTM must be measured and
reported to the TPM component. By doing so, attempts to
hide malicious code within non-measured memory regions
is detected, as represented in Figure 3, showing benign (B)
and malicious (M) basic blocks forming a CFG.
We emphasize that BootKeeper does not rely on a-priori knowl-
edge of the legitimate CFG of firmware images. Instead, the goal of
BootKeeper is to ensure that all reachable code will be correctly mea-
sured and reported to the TPM at runtime. As such, the detection
of malicious code is a two-stage process: a static part (BootKeeper)
which ensures that the verification code is correctly implemented,
and a dynamic part (the measured boot process), which relies on
those mechanisms.
Recall the attacker model presented in subsection 3.1: (3) the
SCRTM executes in a non-malicious environment (i.e., the initial
state of the system is non-malicious, only firmware images are)
and (4) it does not implement I/O mechanisms. As a consequence,
dynamic code injection attacks are specifically excluded.
4 SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the algorithmic properties of our analysis
components.
4.1 Code Integrity Properties (CIP) Validation
The process of validating the Code Integrity Properties presented
in subsubsection 3.2.1 relies on four analysis steps: (1) Detecting
TPM write operations inside the firmware code, (2) Detecting hash
functions inside the firmware code, (3) Validating the authenticity
of hash functions, (4) Validating the atomicity of the measurement
process. We now describe how the system achieves each step of the
analysis.
4.1.1 TPMWrite Operation Detection. The first step of our analysis
is to identify the TPM write operations inside the firmware code.
Such operations can be identified by searching for standard API
prototypes. According to the TPM specification version 1.2 [31, 32],
such functions must use a fixed address (0xFED40000 is the de-
fault), along with an offset used for distinguishing among different
operations (e.g., read and write) on the TPM registers.
Unfortunately, we cannot predict how the compiler organizes
the instructions or how the code of the firmware performs the write
accesses. Developers tend to create abstraction layers (e.g., to avoid
redundancy or to have a modular code), and may use different op-
timization flags for the compilation of the firmware. As a result
of this, TPM read and write operations do not straightforwardly
appear as an offset from the specified constant address value in the
binary executable version of the firmware. Therefore, in order to
tackle this problem and find a state of the program where a write
access to the TPM known address happens, we leverage symbolic
execution, starting at the entry point of the firmware, and record ev-
ery instruction writing at the specified address (0xFED40024 in our
case). This step of symbolic execution allows BootKeeper to resolve
computed addresses for which it would be extremely difficult to
reason about in a purely static setup. We leverage the angr [6] plat-
form to perform symbolic execution. During symbolic execution,
the system tracks the state of registers and memory throughout
program execution along with the constraints on those variables.
Whenever a conditional branch is reached, the execution follows
both paths while applying constraints to the program state to reflect
whether the condition evaluates to True or False. At the end of this
analysis step, BootKeeper has obtained a list of addresses in the
firmware corresponding to the TPM write operations, if any such
operation is present. If the system does not find any TPM write
operation, it flags the firmware image as non-valid.
4.1.2 Detecting Hash Functions. The second step of our analysis is
to identify hash functions among the functions used by the firmware
image to elaborate the measurement values. We apply the following
algorithm. The analyzer starts from the TPM write operations and
works iteratively on the instructions flow in reverse order. To this
end, we leverage a static backward approach [15]. where for each
identified TPM write operation, our analyzer computes a backward
slice starting from the sensitive data. Sensitive data are the param-
eters of the TPM write operations, in our case the measurements
value of the hash function stored in a particular memory region.
The aim of this backward slicing analysis step is to identify mod-
ifications on sensitive data, and to find all the data sources from
which the modified data is derived.
The backward slice technique allows us to focus our analysis
only on the instructions that lead to a single TPM write access,
which is important for two reasons. First, for performance reasons,
focusing on a subset of the program greatly improves the time
needed to perform further analyses. Second, and more importantly,
it ensures that the TPM write access is connected to a measurement
computed earlier in the execution (i.e., not inserted in an ad-hoc
manner). Hence, given a set of instructions related to the TPMwrite
access, BootKeeper detects if an actual measurement is present.
The output of this analysis step is a set of traces corresponding to
instructions correlated with the TPM write operations parameters.
Such traces could also be leveraged to locate the hash function
code as well. However, it is worth noting that the backward slic-
ing algorithm returns an over-approximation of the instructions
leading to the program point where the TPM measurements are
sent, and therefore, it might include unrelated instructions. For
example, functions which simply move computed hash values from
one memory structure to another may also be whitelisted by this
analysis. For this reason, we cannot simply rely on this technique
to accurately locate the hash functions themselves, and we leverage
a different approach to precisely locate those, as presented in the
following paragraph.
4.1.3 Validating the Authenticity of Hash Functions. After Boot-
Keeper has identified the set of instructions related to a particular
TPM operation, it extracts the corresponding blocks and attempts
to recognize one of the possible valid hash function (e.g., SHA-1). In
order to automatically identify cryptographic functions within bi-
nary code, we leverage the approach presented by Lestringant et al.
[17] which relies on Data Flow Graph (DFG) isomorphism. From a
high-level perspective, this approach compares the code structure
of known functions with the code structure of unknown functions,
to determine if these implement the same algorithm. This approach
first employs a normalization step (based on a code rewrite mech-
anism), which is designed to increase the detection capability by
erasing the peculiarities of each instance of an algorithm. Then,
by relying on a sub-graph isomorphism algorithm, the normalized
DFG is compared to that of known reference functions. We chose
this approach to recognize functions of well-known libraries which
are used in real-world boot firmware images (including Crypto++
and OpenSSL [21]).
BootKeeper leverages this technique starting from the instruc-
tion traces highlighted in the previous analysis step. From there,
it creates a DFG for each corresponding function of the firmware
image involved in the trace, and attempts to match the signature
of a standard hash function, such as the SHA-1 implementation
of libOpenSSL. The output of this analysis step is the set of ba-
sic blocks belonging to the identified hash function. If no known
hash function is found, then BootKeeper flags the firmware image as
non-valid.
4.1.4 Validating the Atomicity Property. The final step involved
in validating code integrity is to ensure that no modification of
the computed measurements occurs before those are written to
the TPM. From the instruction traces obtained during the back-
ward slicing step (subsubsection 4.1.2), BootKeeper executes the
corresponding code paths symbolically, from the hash function’s
return instruction to the TPM write operation, and rules out the
presence of instructions modifying the computed hash value. In
order to detect such instructions, BootKeeper performs a last step
of forward reaching definition analysis on each identified code path
to ensure that the value stored in the TPM indeed corresponds to
the return value of the correct hash function. If any instruction on a
given path modifies the measurement value, the atomicity property
is violated. In this case, the firmware image is reported as invalid,
and BootKeeper reports the faulty instruction and program path.
4.2 Code Execution Integrity Validation
Recall that, in addition to verifying the correctness of the mea-
surement process, BootKeeper also evaluates the risks of runtime
attacks through a Code Execution Integrity Property (CEIP) de-
scribed earlier in Section 3.2.2, which consists in the completeness
of measurements.
Conceptually, if the measurement process is incomplete, i.e.,
leaving out portions of the code section, it becomes possible for an
attacker to “hide” malicious code in the non-fingerprinted areas,
hence the importance of this property.
4.2.1 Completeness of the Measurements. BootKeeper ensures that
every function in the CFG of the SCRTM is measured. The acute
reader may wonder what becomes of basic blocks of code which is
deemed non-reachable by the control-flow recovery analysis: this
point is discussed in section 6. The CFG is computed by a recur-
sive algorithm which disassembles and analyzes each basic block,
identifies its possible exits (i.e., successors) and adds them to the
graph. It repeats this analysis recursively until no new exits are
identified. CFG recovery has one fundamental challenge: indirect
jumps. Indirect jumps occur when the code transfers control flow
to a target represented by a value in a register or a memory location
(e.g., jmp %eax). Indirect jumps can be categorized in two main
classes: (1) Computed, an example could be an application that uses
values in a register or memory to determine an index into a jump
table stored in memory; (2) Runtime binding, i.e., function pointers
which jump targets are determined at runtime. BootKeeper lever-
ages state-of-the-art analysis techniques for control-flow recovery,
as available in the angr framework [6]. This process leverages a
combination of forced execution, backwards slicing, and symbolic
execution to recover, to the extent possible, all jump targets of each
indirect jump. While it may not always be possible to recover all
jump targets in complex software projects, it is practical in the
context of a boot firmware’s SCRTM due to the minimal aspect of
such a code base. A more detailed discussion of this point and the
practical limitations that it may involve is provided in section 6.
Once BootKeeper has obtained a CFG of the SCRTM, it proceeds
to verify the coverage of the SCRTM in terms of code fingerprinting.
In order to do so, BootKeeper analyses all input values passed to the
fingerprinting functions (i.e., hash function identified in subsubsec-
tion 4.1.3) to determine the address and size of the memory areas
used to compute the measurements. At this point, BootKeeper has
statically identified the addresses and sizes of the memory regions
that will be fingerprinted by the SCRTM at runtime. Its next step is
to ensure that all reachable code in the SCRTM’s CFG does indeed
fall within the measured memory regions. In order to do so, Boot-
Keeper verifies that the address of each basic block belonging to
the CFG falls within that range. If it is not the case, it means that
a part of the firmware’s code will not be measured correctly, and
flags the firmware image as non-valid.
By ensuring that all the reachable code in the CFG is indeed
measured by the SCRTM, BootKeeper prevents firmware modifica-
tion attacks. where malicious code is inserted within the executable
paths of the firmware’s code.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section presents our experimental results. Our evaluation met-
rics cover multiple attack vectors representing a large span of the
attack surface against the SCRTM. These include the ability of our
prototype to identify and recover the location of TPM write instruc-
tions, the effectiveness of our approach to detect the presence of
forged TPMmeasurements, and to detect possible hidden code areas
which are left unmeasured. In addition to this, we also evaluate the
robustness of our analysis against various compiler optimization
settings.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluate BootKeeper on two real-world implementations of
boot firmware used in the industry, as well as a custom-crafted
malicious firmware implementing state-of-the-art attacks.
(1) SeaBIOS [20], a native x86 BIOS implementation with TPM
support. It also supports standard BIOS features and call-
ing interfaces that are implemented by a typical proprietary
x86 BIOS implementations. This project is meant to provide
an improved and more easily extendable implementation
in comparison to the proprietary counterparts which come
as stock firmware on standard x86 hardware, and can be
deployed as replacement firmware on a variety of mother-
boards.
(2) EDK II [30], a modern, cross-platform firmware platform
supported by a number of real Intel and ARM hardware
platforms. It is a component of Intel’s TianoCore (Intel’s ref-
erence implementation of UEFI). Major vendors (e.g., Apple,
ARM, or HP) contribute to its development, and it serves as a
basis for a number of proprietary UEFI-compliant firmware
implementations.
(3) A custom-crafted malicious firmware image which we imple-
mented to reproduce multiple variants of the state-of-the-art
attacks introduced by Butterworth et al. [4].
For validating cryptographic functions, we are using firmware
(EDK II) that implements the SHA-1 function of the OpenSSL [21]
libraries and gcc as a compiler.
5.2 TPMWrite Access Detection
We evaluated BootKeeper against SeaBIOS, EDK II, and our custom
firmware. Our hypothesis is that complex firmware implementa-
tions, like SeaBIOS and EDK II, use abstraction layers which tend to
obfuscate TPM write instructions, i.e., these do not exhibit such in-
structions in the form of a fixed address corresponding to the specifi-
cation (e.g., mov 0xfed40024, al). Additionally, these abstraction
layers may invoke several functions to initialize data structures, per-
form hardware tests, use loop structures or handle different types of
errors, thus creating many paths, potentially leading our analysis
to path explosion during its symbolic execution phase. In order
to test the resiliency of our approach against the aforementioned
intricacies, but also against compiler optimizations, we evaluated
Table 1: Detection of the functionwriting themeasurements
Optimization
flags
Custom
firmware EDK II SeaBIOS
-O0 ✗
-O1
-O2
-O3
-Os
: detected : not detected ✗ : error
BootKeeper in the context of multiple compiler optimization set-
tings. For each firmware implementation, we produced 5 variants
using different optimization flags: -O1 to -O3 which optimize for
speed, -Os which optimizes for size, and -O0 for no optimization.
This process generates 15 firmware variants. We present the results
in Table 1.
BootKeeper can successfully detect the TPM write access in 80%
of all cases (12 out of 15). During this evaluation phase, we set an
analysis timeout threshold of 10 minutes.
It is worth noting that BootKeeper found all the write access in-
structions within all the tested variants, with the notable exception
of unoptimized EDK II images. We explain this observation by the
fact that a lesser optimization level means more instructions to ex-
ecute, more loops and therefore more likelihood of path explosion
during symbolic analysis. While extending the analysis timeout
threshold would be a viable option, we argue that vendors typically
compile their code with size optimizations (using -Os) when releas-
ing firmware for production use, to reduce memory footprint, in
which case our approach succeeds under the 10 minutes threshold.
In the case of SeaBIOS, the analysis results are missing in the
situation where no optimization is used (-O0). Unfortunately, a
bug in SeaBIOS prevented the code from compiling with this op-
timization level at the time of our evaluation, hence we could not
test it. Nonetheless, BootKeeper can successfully detect TPM write
operations in SeaBIOS in all other optimization settings.
In summary, these experiments demonstrate that our approach
can correctly detect the TPM write operations even in intricate
cases, in real-world firmware implementations, from legacy BIOS
to recent UEFI-compliant firmware.
5.3 Forged TPM Measurements Detection
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach against state-
of-the-art attacks, we reproducedmultiple variants of the tick attack,
described by Butterworth et al. [4]. Each developed attack variant
attempts to forge the measurements sent to the TPM by relying on
several techniques: (1) attacking the SHA-1 function, (2) leaving
out non-measured code, (3) modifying the TPM parameters. We
now describe how BootKeeper performs against these attacks.
Hash Function Validation. A first attack attempts to subvert the
hash function results. In order to test this attack, we create two
firmware versions: one without a SHA-1 function, and another
with a modified version of SHA-1 which returns a tampered hash
value. In either case, BootKeeper reports no match when generating
signatures for the function defined inside the instruction traces
(compared against a generated database of common cryptographic
implementations from Crypto++ and libOpenSSL) and reports a
violation of the property “valid hash function”.
Completeness of the Measurement. We evaluate this property by
implementing an attack that can modify the firmware’s code by
including new code to the CFG of the program. More specifically,
we add newmalicious functions to a non-measured code area that is
invoked before returning from the SCRTM code. Since this code is
not included in any measurement performed by the hash function,
BootKeeper can detect it by ensuring that every part of the CFG is
correctly measured (as described previously in subsubsection 4.2.1).
Atomicity Property. In order to validate the atomicity property,
we define a scenario where an attacker properly measures the
firmware with the correct SHA-1 function, but then tampers with
the results by overwriting the measurements with other values be-
fore sending those to the TPM, thus violating the atomicity property
of the measurement operations. During the analysis, BootKeeper
can fetch the parameters of the hash function, and more impor-
tantly the address of the pointer where the hash is stored. Then,
by performing the symbolic execution step described in subsubsec-
tion 4.1.4, it can detect the malicious instruction responsible for
overwriting the measurements.
In order to fully reflect practical analysis challenges, we also
consider the case where an attacker attempts to trick the analy-
sis by incorporating a real measurement using the correct hash
function, and later writing the measured value somewhere else
before sending a forged value to the TPM. We reproduce this attack
scenario to evaluate the resilience of our analysis step presented in
Section 4.1.4 against the presence of false positives involved by the
backward slicing algorithm. In our evaluation, false positives in-
deed occur, but these are effectively filtered by the following step of
forward reaching definition analysis (as expected). In this situation
again, BootKeeper can detect the attack, and report the malicious
instruction responsible for overwriting the measurements.
5.4 Performance
While performance is not critical in the context of an offline analy-
sis setting, we demonstrate the practicality of BootKeeper in terms
of analysis time and memory usage. In the following, we use a
valid firmware for evaluation, and measure the required amount
of time BootKeeper takes to proceed, while monitoring the peak
of RAM usage. In this experiment, we use a single-thread on an
Intel Xeon E312 with 64GB of RAM. The results presented in Ta-
ble 2 were obtained by running this experiment 100 times, and
represent the mean, minimum, maximum values and the standard
deviation of both the runtime (in milliseconds) and the RAM usage
(in megabytes). Executing the entire analysis (i.e., validating the
firmware) takes on average 1 minute and 48 seconds. The memory
usage peaks at 522 megabytes.
6 DISCUSSION
BootKeeper is a purely static approach relying on advanced binary
program techniques to analyze firmware images. As any static ap-
proach, it comes with some challenges. In this section, we describe
Table 2: Time and RAM usage for firmware analysis
Type Minimum Maximum Mean Standarddeviation
Time (ms) 103 950 108 760 105 704 849
RAM (MB) 522.3 522.8 522.7 0.1
in more detail the nature of these challenges, and how BootKeeper
addresses those. Finally, we point to some practical limits of our
approach and propose alternative research directions of interest.
6.1 Theoretical Limitations
In order to detect violations of the properties introduced in Section 3,
BootKeeper relies on a combination of state-of-the-art static analy-
sis techniques, which together provide the basis for implementing
the verification algorithms presented in Section 4. These techniques,
however, are subject to theoretical limits, which prevents our ap-
proach from reasoning about certain classes of properties in all
possible situations.
BootKeeper relies in particular on:
• Static CFG recovery to determine the set of possible exe-
cution paths of a firmware image. The CFG obtained from
binary analysis is neither sound nor complete (the general
problem of deciding if an arbitrary path in a program is
executable is undecidable [22]).
• Symbolic execution and constraint solving, to reason about
the possible concrete values of memory and registers at arbi-
trary points of the execution. Symbolic execution is subject to
the well-known state explosion problem due to its exponen-
tial growing nature, and the general problem of constraint
(SMT) solving is NP complete.
• Data-flow analysis, to isolate program paths involving mea-
surement values, to generate program slices in order to iso-
late the instructions affecting these values, and more gener-
ally, to detect faulty operations. Reasoning about data-flow
at the binary level requires accurate models of data structure
recovery, and is subject to the pointer aliasing problem [22].
Our approach inherits from these general limitations. We discuss
the practical impact of these theoretical limitations in subsection 6.2
below.
6.2 Practical Impact
The following is a discussion of the practical impact of the afore-
mentioned limitations in our approach.
6.2.1 False Positives. In the case where the CFG is too conservative
and includes an overestimate of possible code paths in the graph,
BootKeeper will accordingly operate conservatively during the
verification of property 3, i.e., the completeness of measurements.
While this may lead to false positives in certain circumstances, we
stress that the CFG we obtain from a binary has a basic-block level
granularity. In comparison, vendors typically scan entire memory
regions corresponding to sections from the firmware binary. Why
not just measure entire sections then? Our approach is more fine-
grained, and aims to ensure that the vendor conforms to at least a
defined minimal code coverage corresponding to (an estimation) of
the possible execution paths.
In the case of an incomplete CFG between the return value of
the hash function used in the measurements and the subsequent
TPM write operation, BootKeeper will not be able to compute a
backward slice and therefore will not be able to validate property 2,
i.e., the atomicity of the measurement process. In this case, it will
flag the image as malicious, thus generating a false positive.
6.2.2 False Negatives. Similarly, the CFG may miss edges in the
graph corresponding, such as indirect jumps caused by complex
instances of runtime binding which cannot be resolved even with
symbolic execution. This may happen, among other possible cases,
when external information (i.e., external to the program) is required
to compute the jump target. The presence of such obfuscated or
evasive code in early stages of firmware execution is, by itself, an
excellent indicator of maliciousness which our approach could be
extended with.
When such constructs are benign and part of the official vendor’s
firmware, an attacker may succeed in hiding a payload P if: 1)
the SCRTM omits one portion of executable memory M1 during
the measurements, 2) BootKeeper is missing a part of the CFG
corresponding to a set of basic blocks mapped in memory during
runtime as M2 (in practice, M2 may not be contiguous), and the
following holds true:
M1 ∩M2 , ∅ ∧ |M1 ∩M2 | ≥ sizeo f (P)
Without ruling out the possibility of strong attacker specifically
challenging state-of-the-art static analysis techniques, we estimate
that BootKeeper significantly raises the bar for an attacker to cir-
cumvent the measurement process, and we consider our approach
practical in the context of a large span of possible attacks.
The presented limitations are intrinsic to any static approach,
and cannot trivially be addressed without additional knowledge of
the runtime environment. In the next section, we discuss possible
alternatives to overcome these limitations.
6.3 Alternative Solutions
In order to analyze the program paths involved in firmware during
execution in a dynamic setting, an emulation of all the hardware
components involved during the platform initialization process
would be necessary. Implementing such a system is a cumbersome
engineering task, especially if numerous targets need to be sup-
ported. An alternative approach is to directly instrument the hard-
ware to dump the state of registers and memory as the firmware
executes, the knowledge of which would ease offline analysis. Simi-
lar to this is the Avatar approach [39] which selectively switches
between different execution models, in a setup which is backed by
the physical hardware.
While relevant to this discussion, neither of these approaches fits
within the scope of this paper. In comparison, BootKeeper requires
no hardware nor custom hardware models.
6.4 Obfuscation
Static binary program analysis techniques are vulnerable to the
presence of obfuscation, and it is possible that a malicious firmware
author could attempt to attack BootKeeper in this manner. For in-
stance, Sharif et al. [27] obfuscate conditional code by using the
result of a hash function as a condition replacement. Since cryp-
tographic hash functions have the pre-image resistance property,
it is impossible for constraints solvers to solve all the constraints
generated by the operations of the hash function.
These weaknesses are inherent to any tool relying on static
program analysis [5, 28, 38].
In the context of boot firmware, the problem related to obfusca-
tion is two-fold. First, genuine vendors could use obfuscation tech-
niques to protect their code against reverse engineering. Secondly,
by relying on obfuscation techniques, an attacker could attempt
to defend against automated program analysis. While the former
would affect BootKeeper, the latter may be used as an indicator
malice.
7 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, JohnHeasman developed the first pub-
lic BIOS rootkit by modifying Advanced Configuration and Power
Interface (ACPI) tables stored in the BIOS [9], and he also showed
how to make a persistent rootkit by re-flashing the expansion Read-
Only Memory (ROM) of a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI)
device [10]. Other attacks have been performed since then, Anibal
Sacco and Alfredo Ortega discussed how to inject malicious code in
Phoenix Award BIOS [24] and Jonathan Brossard showed the prac-
ticability of infecting different kinds of firmware [2]. In addition
to papers and proof of concepts of attacks, some malware is also
taking advantage of the lack of security of the boot firmware. For
example, the Chernobyl virus [8], which appeared in 1999, tried to
overwrite the BIOS to make it unbootable. In 2011, the malware
called Mebromi [18] re-flashed the BIOS of its victims to later write
a malicious Master Boot Record (MBR) which infected the OS even
when it was re-installed from scratch.
All these attacks can be detected if the vendor is trustworthy, a
TPM device is present and used correctly. Several misconfiguration
and design issues, however, show that the TPM can be attacked as
well. In this direction, Butterworth et al. [4] demonstrated a replay-
attack that forges the measurement sent to the TPM to fake an
uncorrupted BIOS in case of non-respect of the specifications and
recommendations. Bruschi et al. [3] also showed a replay-attack
in an authorization protocol of the TPM. Sadeghi et al. [25] and
Butterworth et al. [4] revealed that some TPM implementations do
not meet the TCG specifications which may have critical security
implications. Kauer [13] also demonstrated a TPM reset attack
which allows an attacker to forge the PCR values.
Several approaches have been proposed to improve the TPM
technology and the boot firmware integrity techniques. For exam-
ple, Bernhard Kauer proposed a counter measure [13] to the reset
attack on the TPM by using a Dynamic Root of Trust for Mea-
surement (DRTM). In the direction of firmware security, dynamic
analysis using symbolic execution has been extensively used to
find vulnerabilities in firmware [1, 7, 16, 28, 40]. More related to
our work, Bazhaniuk et al. [1] used an approach to detect vulnera-
bilities in boot firmware. Our work is orthogonal to such approach
and focuses on boot firmware phases where vulnerabilities are not
detected or fixed by the vendor and they can be used by an attacker
to tamper with the boot process (e.g., to forge PCRs values).
Butterworth et al. [4] designed a timing-based attestation at the
BIOS level as an alternative to the hashing of the firmware. Such a
technique provides a reliable way to attest the integrity of a platform
even if the attacker has the same privilege level as the SCRTM. The
idea, adapted from previous work on timing-based attestation [26],
is that in the absence of an attacker the time required to perform
a checksum of the firmware will be constant. When an attacker
tries to fake the checksum, she requires additional instructions that
increase the execution time, hence it can be detected by the system.
While this work greatly improves the trust in the remote attestation,
and fixes the vulnerabilities discovered in their paper, it requires
a complicated architecture for being deployed. In fact, it needs to
set up a remote server for the attestation phase and to modify the
interrupt signal handling in the OS to obtain a precise measurement
of the code execution. On the contrary, our approach works without
having an attestation architecture and it only performs static checks
on the firmware boot image.
Recent platforms incorporate immutable, hardware protected
SCRTMs, called Intel Boot Guard [23] and HP Sure Start [11]. They
are immutable SCRTMs that measure and verify at boot time the
BIOS before its execution, thus providing firmware integrity and a
trusted boot chain with a Root-of-Trust locked into hardware. Such
technologies ensure that the first measurement cannot be forged,
since the attacker cannot modify their code. Both technologies,
however, are only available in recent Intel and HP platforms. In
addition, Intel Boot Guard has been showed to be vulnerable to a
certain class of attacks [19]. The advantage of our approach with
respect to those new technologies is twofold. First, it can be used
to protect architectures that are not equipped with such hardware
features. Second, our approach is orthogonal to such hardware
protections, since BootKeeper can be used as a standalone analyzer
from the vendor side for validating the SCRTM code as the last step
of the deployment process. The main contribution of BootKeeper is
related to the software properties that we devise for validating the
measurement process. When BootKeeper is used by the vendor, our
analyzer can perform the same analysis (e.g., enforcing software
properties) at the source code level, and verify that no one tampers
with the measurement task during the developing process.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce BootKeeper, a binary analysis approach
to validate the measurement process of a boot firmware. Our sys-
tem uses static analysis and symbolic execution to validate a set of
software properties on the measurement process implemented as
part of the UEFI measured boot specification. BootKeeper detects
incorrect implementations of UEFI firmware which do not exhaus-
tively or correctly implement the measured boot process, as well
as malicious images crafted with the intention of bypassing the
measured boot process. More specifically, BootKeeper focuses on
the SCRTM, which is the most critical component in the verification
chain. An incomplete SCRTM implementation leaves room for an
attacker to hide code in subsequent parts of the firmware, whereas
a malicious SCRTM voluntarily ignores specific regions where ma-
licious payloads are hidden, or attempts to forge measurements in
order to match the measured values of a legitimate vendor firmware
(i.e., golden values), among other possible attacks.
This approach can greatly improve trust in boot firmware update
procedures. We evaluate BootKeeper against real-world firmware
used in the industry as well as custom malicious firmware images,
and show that our system is able to detect multiple variants of a
variety of attacks from the state-of-the-art in the literature.
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